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This  is  my  land.  I own  it.  I rented  it  on  shares  first;  then  bought
it  on  a  purchase  contract.  It  has  a  power  line  right-of-way  across one
side.  It  fronts  on  a  state  highway  with  a  setback  line  along  it.  There
is  a  limit  to  what  I  could  collect  on  any  new  improvements  in  front
of that  line,  should  the state  take  more  land  for widening  the highway.
It's  zoned  industrial  now  which  doesn't  bother  my  farm  uses,  but  I
think my  assessment is  higher than  if it  had been  zoned  for agriculture.
I  thought  I  had  a  buyer  for  it,  but  I guess  he  was  scared  off by  the
court  order  against  the  processing  plant  next  door-something  to  do
with polluting  the  small  stream  behind  our land  and a  big fishkill  down
river.  I've heard that  they may be  after me because  of the manure from
my cattle.  Some of my new  neighbors used to complain  about the  smell
until  I stopped  spreading  near  them.  This  is  different.  But  hell,  there
hasn't been any fish in that  stream for ten years.  I'll be on  social security
and  signed  up for a  free fishing  license  before they  have fish  in it.
That is not an actual quote from anyone but a way to summarize
this  paper.  Tenure  and  terms  of transfer,  rights  of way,  and  the
like used to  be a  major focus  when  we  talked  about rights in  real
property.  Eminent  domain  and the use  of police power have  long
been  considered  means  of permitting  public  rights  to prevail  over
private rights.  But the interface of public and private rights is shift-
ing.  It  may  be  more  instructive  to  look at the  administration  and
politics  of regulatory  activities  to  understand  what  is  happening
to  property  rights.  Also  property  rights have  to  be  defined  quite
broadly.  Rights  to  social  security,  preservation  of  fish,  and
response  to the  social  pressure  of neighbors  hardly  come  to  mind
when reading law books about what you bought when you recorded
the  deed.
The  breadth  of the  meaning  of property  can  be  seen  best  by
considering  the  many  values  associated  with  property.  These
values  include income,  goods  and services,  consumption  and  sav-
ing.  They also include well-being (consisting of health,  safety,  and
security),  enlightenment,  and  skill  or  proficiency.  Other  values
associated  with  property  are  power  (especially  the  ability  to
influence  the  decisions  of others),  status  and  prestige,  goodness
and stewardship,  and love and friendship.
The  point  is  that the  value  of property  is  made  up  of  many
parts.  Conflict  in values,  conflict between  these many  parts,  con-
flict  over  property-all  lead  to  change  in  the  property  system.
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only a few of the  parts,  such  as services  or goods from alternative
uses of property.  Simplifications  are  necessary  to  get  at the  logic
of property  problems,  but  obviously  they  run  the  risk  of leaving
out  much  that  is  relevant  to  policy  formation  and  public  action.
PROPERTY  AS A  SYSTEM OF  CLAIMS  AND LIABILITIES
Property can be thought of as a system involving the individual,
the state,  and objects.  In our private property system,  individuals,
and  various  groups  acting  as  individuals,  have  a  strong  claim  on
the  benefits  from  property.  The  limited  interest  of  the  state  is
expressed  through  a set of laws  which  define the  role  of the  state
not  only  as  an  arbiter  in  conflicts  between  individuals  but  also
as  a participant  in  the  game.  Examples  include  defending  a  man
against  the  power  of the  state  or  transferring  wealth  from  the
"haves"  to  the  "have  nots."  That  is,  we  have  to  consider  the
state's role not only  in protecting the individual but also  in protect-
ing the  collective  well-being  against  the  economic  behavior of the
individual.
Property has  two functions.  First, it  distributes  claims  for the
benefits  and  liabilities  for  the  burdens  of  society.  Second,  it
allocates  access to use.  Property  is the basis of power and control.
If the individual exercises power and control over use of property,
he has property rights.  Conversely,  if the state  (and at more infor-
mal levels,  the community) exercises  power and control  over use,
public  rights are expressed.
Institutions complete  the property  system. They define or clas-
sify  property  objects  and  interest  holders.  They  express  action
rules.  Not  all  of the  action  rules  are  contained  in  statutory  law
or  court  rulings  and  common  law.  On  occasion,  stewardship
preached  from  the  pulpit  may  have  more  impact  on  rules  of
behavior than if decreed  from the  bench.
POLLUTION  AND LEGAL  REMEDIES
Most  people  think  of  the  courts  as  the  primary  regulators  in
the  property system.  Public action can  also be expressed through
the  power  of government  to  tax  and  spend.  This  is  particularly
true  in  society's newly  found  problem  of pollution.  However,  we
first  need  to  examine  the  search  for  legal  remedies  to  pollution,
especially  recent  use  of the  courts  as  an  institutional  vehicle  for
expressing changes  in the  action  rules concerning  property.
The courts have appeal  as a vehicle  for change  in part because
of the  large  role  which  the  injured  individual  can  play,  at  least
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intercede on  someone's  behalf.  If the person  asking for relief can
show  that  he  has  a  personal  stake  in  the  issue,  he  is  deemed  to
have  "standing"  before the court and he may then have  consider-
able  impact.  A few jurisdictions  and at  least one  state,  Michigan,
have declared  by  legislation that  in environmental  cases everyone
is affected  and thus anyone  has  standing.
In recent pollution cases  the results  are sometimes  measurable
in  terms  of reduced  discharges,  but  more  to  the  point  may  be
the  prevention  of  conflicts,  which  waste  the  time  and  energy  of
polluters  and control agencies.  The uncertainties  may be reduced
by  more careful  development  of planning and  enforcement  proce-
dures,  and this  greater care  may in  turn reduce  pollution.
Nuisance  law,  a  part  of  court-developed  common  law,  has
the  longest history  of use  in  pollution  cases.  The  issue  is  usually
whether your neighboring property owner is unreasonably interfer-
ing with your use of your property,  or with the rights of the public
in  general.  The complainant  must  show  damage  and may  request
payment for damages sustained  in addition  to an injunction to  pro-
hibit  further damages.  Commonly,  damages  are  awarded  but  not
the  injunction,  which  suggests  that  the  award  may  be  viewed  as
compensation  for not  only  past  damages  but  also  for  permanent
reduction  in  market  value  of property  if the  pollution  continues.
Substantial  financial  interests  would  be  at  stake  if the  pollution
were completely  prohibited.  However,  more  and  more  cases  are
resulting in orders for feasible modification  of processes  and prac-
tices  to reduce  future  injury.
Legal  relief  concerning  other  issues  is  less  well  tested  and
developed.  In  cases  of trespassing,  damage  need  not  be  shown,
but the response of the courts has differed little from their response
to  the  nuisance  complaint.  Water  rights  suggest  another  line  of
legal reasoning.  The natural flow theory of riparian doctrine, where
bank  owners  have  rights to  a  reasonable  use  of the water,  states
that  lower owners  have  a right  to  the  flow  undiminished  in  both
quantity  and quality.  But  this  doctrine  is  not  widely  honored.  In
most states,  reasonable  use  is interpreted  as  a fair share that leads
to the highest overall  development from the use of a body of water.
In  states  that  use  prior  appropriation,  right  to  use  may  be  inter-
preted as  maintaining the quality  for lower order and future  users.
California  has  taken the  step  of combining water rights  and water
quality administration  in the  same  board.
Some  statutory  provisions  have  been  proposed  and  a  few
enacted  to facilitate  the use of the  courts for relief from  pollution.
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acts  in  the  name  of a group  or class  of persons  injured  and  asks
the  court  to  apply  the  relief  requested  to  the  whole  group.  De-
claratory judgment  acts offer the opportunity  to ask the courts  to
spell  out  the  validity  of agency  actions  and  the  environmental
issues  that  should be considered.
Under  the  National  Environmental  Policy  Act  of  1969,  for
example,  environmental  impact reports  are  required  on  all feder-
ally  related  projects.  Many  agencies  have  found  themselves  in
court  to defend  the adequacy  of their  statements.  But the impact
of the  courts  is  limited  by  their  reluctance  to  second  guess  the
officials  responsible  for making the decisions  at hand.  Courts limit
themselves  to protecting the  due process  rights of those affected.
They  will  require  more  adequate  procedures  to  comply  with  the
statutes  under  review.  But  once  satisfied  that  the  proper  steps
have  been taken,  reasonable  studies made,  and reports circulated,
they  will  not  assume  the  decision-making  prerogatives  of  the
responsible  officials.  Thus,  the  act  may  add  little  that  is  new  to
the  real decision-making  process.  "Bad faith"  must be  shown  to
reverse  a  decision  if  all  the  procedural  requirements  have  been
met.
Court actions  are dramatic  and can affect  agency  and  polluter
behavior.  They  have  an impact  on the  system of property  rights,
helping  to  shift  the  balance  between  private  and  public  rights.
However,  administrative  actions  that  exercise  the  police  power
of the state,  though perhaps  less  dramatic  individually,  may have
a  much greater total  impact on behavior.
The  nature of private  rights and public rights  can be described
in terms of a continuum between private  property rights and com-
mon property rights.  An owner of an asset which enjoys the status
of a  "pure"  private  property  has exclusive  use of that  asset  and
may  transfer it freely.  These  are  characteristics  of the asset.  The
social results  are  best when  the object or asset  is  easily  divisible.
Its  use  fully  excludes  value  taken  by  others,  and  in  using  it  the
owner  excludes  rivals.  Externalities  from that use  are  then insig-
nificant.  The  price  and  market  system  will  operate  effectively.
Price effects  transfer with  little or no cost.
At the other end of the continuum are common property rights.
Rights  to  view  a  sunset  or  to  civil  liberty  are  not  exclusive  to
any one  owner.  They  are  not transferable.  The  use  by one  does
not  diminish  that  available  for another  user.  The  social  benefits
from  such  objects  are  greatest  when  the  cost  of supplying  them
is  zero  or  close  to  it.  When  resources  must  be  used  to  supply
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underutilized.  However,  at  low  or  zero  price  overcrowding  or
overexploitation  results  with  the  attendant  loss  of the  ability  to
provide  value.  This  is the  "tragedy  of the commons."
But most  of life  goes  on between  these extremes.  Others  take
pleasure  in your clothes,  your car, and your home.  Many  factors,
such  as age,  residence,  training,  income,  and  the like,  limit  trans-
ferability.  Price  is  not  enough  to  effect  transfer.  Rights  depend
upon  status.  Institutions  and  their  behavior  rules  define  status
rights,  making private goods more  like common property and vice
versa,  as conflicts  in value  arise.
REGULATORY  DECISION MAKING-WHERE  THE ACTION IS
Regulation  of pollution provides  a good example  of how institu-
tional processes  are  changing the character  and balance of private
and public rights and interests  in property.  An  examination  of the
politics  of regulatory  decision  making  helps  us  understand  how
such institutions  change the rules of behavior of the interest hold-
ers  and the object classes  involved.
What are  the elements of such decision making? There is  often
an element  of prior  clearance.  The  person  injured  does not  have
to  act  first;  the  potential  polluter  must  ask  for  a  permit.  If not,
at  least  some  standard  of behavior  has  been  spelled  out,  which
can later be judged to have been violated. Often there is an element
of supervision  over the initiation of the potentially  damaging activ-
ity.  And there  is  an  element of later review  for compliance.  The
expectation  is  that  the regulator  will  not be  passive  but  will  seek
out  the  wrongdoer.  How  these  elements  are  expressed  varies
greatly,  affecting  the  capacity  of the  regulating  agency  to  fulfill
its duty.
These  elements  of decision  making have  a  number of charac-
teristics.  A public  interest  to be  served,  legal  authority  to  do  so,
and the power to take the initiative are perhaps obvious.  Less obvi-
ous  is  the need  to be  comprehensive  with  respect  to  the  system
being  regulated,  such  as  a  watershed  or  a  basin.  Also  technical
competence  to  set  standards  and  determine  compliance  are  not
always  to be taken  for granted.
If this is regulatory decision making, it is not hard to understand
why  most institutions  established  for the  purpose  fail  to  achieve
the expectations  of many  of those  who  supported  their creation.
The  political  constraints  are  severe  and  not  always  appreciated
by those  same  supporters.  Success is conditioned  by  the degree of
consent of the regulated  to be regulated.  This consent is  achieved
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little  choice  but to  bargain.
Why  must  the  regulators  bargain  with  the  polluters?  Pollution
is  a  matter  of definition.  There  are  hundreds  of polluting  sub-
stances,  many existing  in  nature.  At  each  step  in definition  there
is room for interpretation and disagreement.  Conflict with the reg-
ulated  usually  occurs  at every  step.  Standard  setting  is  a  kind of
planning  process.  What  uses  should  determine  the  classification
for a  stream? Once  uses have  been determined,  requirements  dic-
tate  the minimum  levels  of quality  to  be  maintained.  Should  the
quality  of  individual  discharges  be  a  part  of the  standard?  Or
should  only  a  stream  standard  be used,  making an individual  dis-
charge a violation when it proves to be responsible  for degradation
below stream standards? The regulator has many choices in seeking
compliance-whom  to ignore,  how long to wait,  what to accept  as
compliance.  For  many  years  regulators  were  forced  to  accept  a
statement  of future  intent  to comply  as compliance.
The  timing of action by the regulator can  be critical  in  gaining
support.  The  big  employer  in  the  community  with  the  obsolete
plant,  with other  reasons  to relocate  elsewhere  is  in  a strong bar-
gaining  position.  The  regulator  must  pick  a  time  to  obtain  max-
imum support and incur minimum blame.  It is often very attractive
to wait.  The relevant  constituencies  have a chance  to show  them-
selves  and  demonstrate  their  strength.  The  regulated  and  their
allies  may  be forced  out  in  response  to  demands  by the  environ-
mentalists and their allies.  Federal agencies  have a chance to show
their  backstopping  support,  or lack of it,  provide  funds  and  pub-
licity,  or a lack of either.
There are  a number of situational factors that force bargaining.
The polluter, for example,  has most of the relevant technical infor-
mation.  He  knows  more  about  his  own  processes  and  how  they
can be  modified,  what  is in his wastes,  and how  to remove  them.
He can  use this knowledge  of feasible  remedies  to lend credibility
to his  arguments.
Many  myths  and  values  force  the  need  for  bargaining.  The
very  words  "filth"  and  "exploitation"  suggest  a  polarized  view
of the  problem.  Others  see  "jobs"  and  "development"  at  stake.
The regulator has  little  choice but  to seem  to compromise.
The  regulator  also  faces  different  mixes  of constituencies  at
different  levels  and  points  in  the  political  structure.  Different
agencies  serve  different  clienteles  and  have  as  a  result  different
postures with respect to the regulator's  task. One house of a legis-
lature  may  be dominated  by "hawks"  or by "doves"  on the  envi-
68ronment or on economic  development.  An elected  executive  may
differ  in  his  point  of view  from the  legislature.  Local,  state,  and
federal  levels  can  have  different  mixes.  The  regulator  may  have
to  deal  with  all  of them.  A  bargained  result  is  almost  inevitable
if for no other reason than that conflict may be taken as a symptom
of the  regulator's  incompetence.  A  bargain  resulting  in tolerable
working  arrangements  has  high  value  in  keeping  the  wheels  of
government turning.  The regulating agency knows that it and those
regulated will be there together long after a current flurry of public
interest  and debate.
ARBITRATION-AN  ADMINISTRATIVE  APPROACH  FOR THE FUTURE?
Arbitration has been most fully  developed in the area of labor-
management  disputes.  But  it  may  have  a  place  in  environmental
problems,  particularly  land  use  conflicts  that  do  not  lend  them-
selves  to  the  usual  regulatory  processes,  such  as  in  water  and
air pollution.  But what will  serve as  "collective  bargaining  agree-
ments"  for environmental  problems?
A  task  force  of the  American  Law  Institute  has  considered
some elements of this question in a review of zoning,  which  simply
was  not  getting  the job  done.  The  task force  considered  a quasi-
judicial  process to  allow  arbitration  of land use  conflicts between
agencies,  between levels of government, between local people  and
utilities  based  on  the  merits  of  each  use.  Highway  and  park
agencies  disagree  over  routes.  Park  authorities  often  want  land
uses  around park entrances  to be consistent with the environment
in the park.  The location of power lines and plant sites often  con-
flicts  with  the  aims  of local  land  use controls.  The  examples  are
endless,  which  is  part of the problem.
Who  can  wield  this  kind  of arbitration  power?  The  power  to
decide  often  resides  at  a level no lower than the governor's  man-
sion or the halls of the legislature.  A view  of property  institutions
as  consisting  of  interest  holders,  object  classes,  and  rules  of
behavior  is  helpful but  perhaps  too  simple  here.  Our government
is  a  system  of  active  and  latent  interest  groups  (the  public),
agencies,  and elected  officials.  New institutions,  or old ones with
broadened  functions,  will  evolve  in this  context.
69